How Should Payment Services be Taxed? by Lockwood, Ben & Yerushalmi, Erez
How Should Payment Services be Taxed?∗
Forthcoming 2019, Social Choice and Welfare
Ben Lockwood† Erez Yerushalmi‡
October 2018
Abstract
This paper considers the design of taxes on real money balances and bank payment services,
when realistically, the household can use either cash or a bank payment account for the purchase
of different varieties of goods. These taxes, plus a consumption tax, fund a government revenue
requirement. We find that generally, real money balances and bank transaction fees should be
taxed, and at different rates, i.e. the tax system should not leave the choice of payment services
undistorted. For a wide class of time transactions cost technologies, including the Baumol-Tobin
case, (i) fees should be taxed at a lower rate than real money balances, and (ii) the tax on real money
balances should be positive. However, it is possible that fees should be subsidized. The rate of tax
on fees has no simple relationship to the optimal consumption tax, and can be higher or lower. A
Corlett-Hague type intuition for these results is also developed, which relies on the concept of a
virtual time endowment.
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1 Introduction
This paper addresses a relatively neglected issue, the optimal taxation of payment services. By
payment services, we mean the services provided by the banking system that facilitate payment for
goods and services. There is of course, a large literature on the optimal taxation of fiat money, the
so-called inflation tax literature. This literature focuses on conditions for the zero taxation of cash,
i.e. the Friedman rule, which says that the nominal interest rate should be zero. In this literature,
however, it is assumed, without exception, that cash is the only medium of payment, or that some
goods can be bought on credit, and so the issue of how services provided by the banking system should
be taxed is not addressed.1
This focus on cash may have been justified thirty years ago, when the use of a bank account
meant the writing of a check, and most transactions were made using cash. However, the focus on
the literature on cash is clearly increasingly unrealistic because technological advances have allowed
so-called electronic transfer of funds at the point of sale, by using credit and debit cards. These
services are rapidly overtaking cash as means of payment for retail transactions.2
For example, based on a large-scale payment diary survey, conducted between 2009 and 2012 in
seven major countries, Bagnall et al. (2016) report that the share of the number of transactions with
cash is on average of 62 percent (between 46 to 82 percent, varying by country), while its value share
is on average of 35 percent (between 15 to 65 percent).3 As expected, this shows that a larger number
of smaller valued transactions are made by cash, and that the larger value transactions are made by
other means. In recent years, the share of cash has fallen further. For example, in the US, the share
of cash in retail transactions fell from 40 percent in 2012 to 32 percent in 2015 (Matheny et al., 2016).
On the other hand, it is unlikely that cash will disappear altogether as a medium of payment; as
reported by the Cash Product Office of the US Federal Reserve, “In 2015, cash continued to domi-
nate small-value transactions, with cash being used for more than 50 percent of transactions under
$25....(and ) for more than 60 percent of purchases under $10.” (Matheny et al., 2016, p6). Again,
in another large scale payment diary survey in the Euro Area in 2016, for a subset of EU countries,
Esselink and Hernández (2017) report an even higher ratio of cash usage than Bagnall et al. (2016),
for countries such as Cyprus, Greece, and Malta, which used above 70% cash by transactions value.
Does the choice of payment method matter? At a macroeconomic level, Philippon (2015) and Bazot
(2018), show that the costs of financial intermediation for the banking sector in the US and Europe
are considerable; for the US, they estimate these costs at around 2.5% of assets intermediated. The
specific costs of operating payments services such as Mastercard, Visa etc are also large; for example
a 2012 study by the European Central Bank estimated the average resource cost of non-cash payment
systems across EU-27 at about 1% of GDP (Schmiedel et al., 2012). This translates to about 2.8% of
1See for example, Correia and Teles (1996, 1999) which consider a transactions cost theory of money demand, or Chari et al.
(1991, 1996), where some goods can be bought on costless credit. More recent models include a more micro-founded search
theoretic demand for fiat money e.g. Aruoba and Chugh (2010), but existing models of this type do not include a banking
sector. The literature is surveyed in Kocherlakota (2005) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010).
2As a result of these trends, the provision of payment services is an increasing source of both activity and profit for banks
and payment network operators, such as VISA and Mastercard. For example, in the United States, the fee averages approxi-
mately 2% of transaction value. This is giving rise to large and growing revenues and profits for both banks and the operators.
For example, DeYoung and Rice (2004) estimate that in the US in 2003, non-interest income accounted for half of all bank
income, and 52% of non-interest income was generated by fees associated with payment accounts. Visa, the largest payment
network operator, had gross income and profit of $18.36 bln. and $11.69 bln. in the 2017 financial year.
3The countries were Austria, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, USA.
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the value of consumption facilitated by payments systems.4 But, these costs have to be set against
the benefits to consumers in terms of greater time saving, convenience, and security.
Given these two methods of payment for goods, the question then arises as to how they should
be taxed, if a government has to use distortionary taxes to raise revenue. This paper studies the
optimal tax structure in a model that combines the transaction cost theory of the demand for money
(for example Correia and Teles (1996); Teles (2003)), with the model of Freeman and Kydland (2000),
which allows for substitution between cash and use of bank accounts. In our model, the household
demands different varieties of goods in different quantities, and these can be paid for either by cash,
or by electronic transfer of funds at the point of sale, provided by a bank account. We will call this
account a payment account (PA) 5.
The time transactions cost of holding cash is modeled in the usual way, by assuming that goods
bought with cash require a time input from the household, which can be lowered by holding a higher
stock of real money balances.
We model the cost of using a PA by assuming that the bank charges a per transaction fee to the
seller of the good, which is then passed on to the consumer by the seller.6 To make our point as clearly
as possible, we assume the use of the PA requires no time input from the household. While this is an
abstraction, it is increasingly close to reality, with so-called "contactless" payment via debit card, and
mobile phone apps for management of bank accounts becoming increasingly widespread.
To ensure that the choice between cash and a PA is not trivial, we assume that cash has a real
resource cost, as in Correia and Teles (1996). The reason for this is that if cash were free, the optimal
inflation tax would be zero, and then the household would use only cash.7 We then show that in
equilibrium, there will be a "switch point" above which varieties in greater demand will be bought
using the PA.
The government has a fixed revenue requirement in each period, and to finance this, can tax
the payment fees charged by banks, and can also tax real money balances via an inflation tax. In
addition, the government has the use of a consumption or income tax. In this setting, we characterize
optimal payment service taxes i.e. the structure of taxes on both real money balances and the fees,
as well as the consumption tax. Our main contribution is to develop simple formulae for the optimal
ad valorem taxes on both real money balances and transactions fees. It turns out that the structure
of taxes on these two payment methods only depend on the characteristics of the time transactions
cost of cash, not the form of the household utility function.
Specifically, in our setting, the time used for transactions is a function of the value of goods bought
with cash (cash purchases), and real money balances. Then, both the sign of each tax, and the ratio of
these two taxes, depend only on the properties of the time transactions cost function. Assuming that
this function is homogeneous of degree k, both taxes are decreasing in k. The tax on cash is also in-
creasing in elasticity of the marginal time transactions cost of additional cash purchases with respect
to real money balances. Similarly, the tax on fees is also increasing in elasticity of the marginal time
transactions cost of additional cash purchases with respect to cash purchases. If k ≤ 1, the tax on
4On average, in the EU, consumption is about 70% of GDP. Also, as a rough approximation, about 50% of total transactions
are non-cash. So, the percentage is 1%/(0.7x0.5)=2.8%.
5So, a payment account is what is known as a checking account in the USA, and a current account in the UK.
6These fees are known as merchant discount fees. The bulk of this is made up of a change for card use by the card-issuing
bank, known as the interchange fee, and the reminder of the merchant discount fee goes to the card company and the acquiring
bank.
7This is discussed formally in Section 3.4.
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real money balances is always positive, but the tax on fees may be negative. We also find conditions
on the time transactions cost of cash such that the taxes are positive, and that the tax on cash is
always higher than the tax on fees.
The general intuition for these results is based on the concept of a “virtual” time endowment.
Specifically, we can reduce the tax design problem for the government to a completely standard one,
except that the household has, instead of a fixed time endowment, a “virtual” time endowment that
is endogenous, and depends on k and the share of goods bought with cash and real money balances.
This virtual time endowment is of course not directly taxable, but can be indirectly taxed by taxes on
payment services insofar as they affect the share of goods bought with cash and real money balances.
For example, a tax will be positive if it indirectly reduces the virtual time endowment. Thus, in gen-
eral terms, the intuition is similar to that of Corlett and Hague (1953), who argue that taxes should
be set to indirectly tax non-taxable leisure. However, the specific mechanism is quite different; in
Corlett and Hague (1953), the key variable is the degree of complementarity in preferences between
leisure and the taxed goods. Here, it is the properties of the transactions technology that are key.
We also relate our results to the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) production efficiency result. One
can interpret the transactions technology in our model as a form of household production, where
inputs in the form of cash balances and PAs, combined with market purchases and time, produce
final consumption. Our result is that even with a constant returns transactions time technology,
these inputs to final consumption should generally be taxed. In other words, the Diamond-Mirrlees
principle that inputs should not be taxed with constant returns in production does not extend to the
household in this context.
Our results also have implications for the literature on the optimal inflation tax. For example,
we show that the findings of Correia and Teles (1996) are not robust to introducing substitutability
between cash and PAs.8 Specifically, we show that when both payment media are used, real money
balances should be taxed even when k = 1, in contrast to their findings when cash is the only medium
of payment.9
We then turn to some numerical simulations, using a calibrated version of the model. We find that,
consistently with our analytical results, both the inflation tax and the tax on fees decrease markedly
as the returns to scale in transactions costs increase from zero to one. The results show also that
both inflation tax and the tax on fees decrease as the bank fee increases. This is interesting as the
move away from cash that we currently observe is ultimately driven by technological innovation that
reduces fees. Moreover, when the fee is large or when returns to scale are close to one, the tax on
fees can be negative i.e. bank fees should be subsidized. We also find that the tax on bank fees can
be greater or less than the rate of consumption tax although both taxes are of the same order of
magnitude.
Our findings have some implications for the current policy debate on the taxation of banks, es-
pecially in Europe, where it is the view of many, including the European Commission, that banks
8The Correia-Teles model is a special case of ours, as explained in Section 3.5
9The work of Correia and Teles (1996) has already shown, however, that in an environment where only cash is used
for transactions, such an efficiency result (i.e. a zero inflation tax) requires the additional condition that the transactions
technology for cash must be constant returns to scale. The intuition is that if (say) the transactions technology is decreasing
returns, this creates a "virtual profit" for the household which can be taxed via a positive inflation tax. This is, of course,
analogous to the original Diamond-Mirrlees result, which states that inputs to production should be untaxed as long as there
are constant returns to scale (or 100% profit taxation), but taxed if there are decreasing returns to scale (Stiglitz and Dasgupta,
1971).
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are under-taxed, because many of their services are exempt from VAT.10 In this debate, it is largely
assumed that within a consumption tax system, such as a VAT, it is desirable to tax financial services
at the standard rate of VAT e.g. Ebrill et al. (2001).11 Our results provide some support for this posi-
tion, in that we find that payment services provided by banks should be taxed positively in a number
of cases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of related
literature. Sections 3 to 5 outline the model. Section 6 presents the main results. Section 7 presents
a calibrated version of the model, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper relates to a number of literatures. First, there is a small literature directly addressing
the taxation of payment services (Grubert and Mackie, 2000; Jack, 2000; Auerbach and Gordon,
2002). With the exception of Auerbach and Gordon (2002), these papers use a simple two-period
consumption-savings model without an explicit production sector, and assume that payment services
are consumed in fixed proportion to aggregate consumption.12 In this setting, it is straightforward to
show that if there is a pre-existing consumption tax at the same rate in both periods, the marginal
rate of substitution between present and future consumption is left unchanged if payment services
are taxed at the same rate as consumption.
Auerbach and Gordon (2002) consider a multi-period life-cycle model of the consumer where pur-
chase of goods requires payment services, which themselves are produced using other inputs. Pay-
ment services are assumed to be demanded in strict proportion to consumption. They show that if
there is initially only a labor income tax imposed on the household, then this is equivalent to a value-
added tax if and only if the payment services consumed by the household are taxed at the same rate
as other goods.13
There are, however, a number of restrictive assumptions implicit in these existing models. First,
and foremost, they do not allow the household to choose between cash and other payment services.
Second, other taxes are assumed fixed, not optimized, and it is implicit that the existing taxes are
non-distortionary, because the analysis proceeds by finding conditions under which taxation of pay-
ment services does not introduce any further distortions. By contrast, we take an explicit tax design
approach to the question, investigating the second-best tax structure.
The second related literature is on the optimal inflation tax. This literature is mature, and there
are a number of well-known reasons why the Friedman rule may not hold and it may be optimal
to tax real money balances. These include the existence of pure profit due to decreasing returns to
scale, or imperfect competition in the product market, or tax evasion (see for example, the surveys
by Kocherlakota (2005) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010)). Our model has none of these features,
10Currently, within European Union countries, most financial intermediation services are exempt from VAT, notably finan-
cial services which are not explicitly priced (De La Feria and Lockwood, 2010; PWC, 2010; Buettner and Erbe, 2012).
11See also the recent IMF proposals for a Financial Activities Tax levied on bank profits and remuneration, one version of
which - FAT1 - would work very much like a VAT (IMF, 2010).
12Chia and Whalley (1999), using a computational approach, reach the rather different conclusion that no intermediation
services should be taxed, but their model is not directly comparable to these others, as the intermediation costs are assumed
to be proportional to the price of the goods being transacted.
13In particular, they show that if there is initially a wage income tax at rate τ, which is replaced by a consumption tax at
equivalent rate τ/(1 − τ), then the real equilibrium is left unchanged if and only if payment services are also taxed at this
equivalent rate.
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but we still find violation of the Friedman rule, for completely different reasons. Moreover, in spite
of the large literature on the Friedman rule, we are not aware of any paper that studies the optimal
tax structure on both cash and non-cash payment instruments.
A third related literature is the one on optimal taxation with household production (Sandmo
(1990); Piggott and Whalley (2001); Kleven et al. (2000)). This literature has a number of similari-
ties to ours. Specifically, the complementarity of purchased inputs and household time in household
production is an important determinant of the optimal tax structure, and also, there is generally
production inefficiency; that is, taxes distort the choice of inputs to household production. The rela-
tionship of our results to theirs is further discussed in Section 6 below.
Finally, there is a recent literature studying banks that engage in socially undesirable activities
such as excessive risk-taking.14 The main finding is that these should be corrected by Pigouvian
taxes (or regulations) that apply directly to these decision margins, such as taxes on borrowing or
lending. Our work is distinct from this line of inquiry, as the banking sector has no external effects in
our setting; we are concerned with the design of taxes to raise revenue. So, we are studying "boring
banks" in the terminology of Aigner and Bierbrauer (2015), to which our paper is also related. They,
however, focus on tax incidence issues, whereas we are concerned with tax design.
3 The Model
The model is a modified version of the Freeman and Kydland (2000) model. This model has a number
of attractive features which generates an equilibrium where cash and PAs co-exist, and where small
items will be purchased with cash and larger items will be purchased with PAs. These are: (i) the
consumption bundle is sorted by the sizes of the purchases, (ii) there is a time cost of using cash, and
(iii) there is a fixed cost per transaction of using the PA. All these features are needed for a non-trivial
analysis of the effects of payment services taxes on household behavior. The exact relationship of our
set-up to Freeman and Kydland (2000) is discussed further in Section 3.5 below.
3.1 Set-Up
A large number of identical households live for periods t = 1, ..∞. In each period, they consume a
number of different varieties of a consumption good j ∈ [0, 1], supply labor, and can also hold cash,
bank deposits and government bonds. The banks take deposits and use them to buy government
bonds, and also provide payment services to depositors. The government issues bonds and sets taxes
to finance an exogenous level of public good provision in each period.
3.2 Firms and Banks
In each period, a single competitive firm produces an intermediate good from labor, where one unit
of labor produces one unit of the good. One unit of this intermediate good can be transformed by a
seller j into one unit of variety j ∈ [0, 1] of the consumption good. All sellers are perfectly competitive
price takers and thus set a price of variety j equal to the price of the intermediate good.
14See e.g. Acharya et al. (2012); Bianchi and Mendoza (2010); Jeanne and Korinek (2010); Keen (2011); Perotti and Suarez
(2011) Keen (2011).
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A single competitive bank offers a PA to the households. It takes nominal deposits Dt from the
household in period t, and purchases government bonds BBt . The bank also provides payment ser-
vices, using the intermediate good as an input. Specifically, any variety j can be purchased using
the PA at a cost of f per purchase in units of the intermediate good. As the bank is competitive, we
assume that the cost is just passed on to the household, without any mark-up.
This fee can be taxed at rate τft so the household faces a cost f
(
1 + τft
)
if it chooses to purchase
variety i using a PA. We interpret f as covering all costs associated with the banking system. So,
f measures, inter alia, the costs of physical bank branches, and all labor and other costs associated
with PAs. Included in this would be the bank interchange fee that a card-issuing bank charges the
seller of the good for the use of the card.15
Finally, the stock of bonds outstanding at t pay a nominal interest rate it. As the bank is perfectly
competitive, this is also the return on deposits.
3.3 Households
The single infinitely lived household has preferences over levels of consumption goods and leisure
t = 0, ..∞ of the form:
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, lt) , ct = min
j∈[0,1]
{ct (j) /2j} (1)
where ct(j) is the level of consumption of variety j in period t, lt is the consumption of leisure. We
assume u (c, l) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and that ucl ≥ 0, where subscripts denote
derivatives. Also, 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor.
The fixed coefficients specification for the commodity index follows Freeman and Kydland (2000);
it allows for consumption levels of the different varieties to vary in an analytically tractable way. In
particular, all varieties will be consumed in fixed proportions to some c, i.e.
c (j) = 2cj, j ∈ [0, 1] (2)
Note that aggregate consumption is
∫ 1
0
c (j) dj = c.
The household can use either cash or the PA to make purchases. The advantage of using the PA is
that relative to cash, it economizes on household time. To make this point as cleanly as possible, we
assume that use of the PA requires no time. This is an increasingly close approximation to reality,
as many card transactions are contactless (i.e. do not even require a security (PIN) number) and
accounts can be managed via smart-phone apps. On the other hand, cash is costly in terms of time,
for several reasons that are well-documented in the literature; it has to be physically withdrawn from
ATMs, stored securely, etc.
We capture this by supposing that a volume x ≡ 2c ∫
T
jdj of consumption bought with cash re-
quires s (x,m) units of time, where T ⊂ [0, 1] is the subset of goods that are bought with cash, and m
is real money balances, defined below. We assume that s is twice continuously differentiable, increas-
ing in x and decreasing in m. We will also assume that an increase in the use of money reduces the
marginal transactions cost i.e. sxm < 0. This general specification s (x,m) of the time transactions
15In practice, the bank interchange fee is a fixed charge f, plus a percentage of the value of the transaction. For example,
in the US, Visa currently charges either $0.15 plus 0.80% or $0.21 plus 0.05% for debit card retail transactions, depending on
whether the bank is exempt (small) or regulated (large, over $10 billion in assets). This second percentage cost element could
be introduced without changing any of the qualitative results.
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cost of cash is standard in the literature, and includes a number of well-known special cases. For ex-
ample, with the inventory-theoretic demand for money of Baumol and Tobin, s has the interpretation
of the time cost of the number of trips to the bank, so s = α xm , where α is the time cost per trip, and
x
m is the number of trips. A rather different specification is used in the more recent literature on the
optimal inflation tax; for example, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010) assume s = σ
(
x
m
)
x, where σ(.)
is strictly increasing.
Now note that given a level c of aggregate consumption, a switch from cash to a PA as a payment
instrument for variety j has a financial cost for the consumer of f
(
1 + τf
)
, and a time saving of
∂s
∂j = sx2cj, where here and in what follows, subscripts denote partial derivatives, so that for example
sx =
∂s
∂j . At the household optimum, because the wage is unity, both are measured in the same units,
so the net cost is f
(
1 + τf
)− sx2cj. It is immediate that the net cost of using the PA is decreasing in
j, so in any period t, there will be a critical index j∗t such that all goods j < j∗t are bought with cash,
and all goods j > j∗t are bought with the PA. This is consistent with what is observed in practice,
where cash is used for small transactions, and PAs for larger transactions.16
So, xt, the volume of goods bought with cash, is
xt = 2
∫ j∗t
0
ctjdj = (j
∗
t )
2
ct (3)
Finally, following Correia and Teles (1996) and Teles (2003), to get mt, we deflate nominal money
holdings by the period t price level Pt, inclusive of the consumption tax i.e.
mt =
Mt
Pt (1 + τ ct )
This captures the idea that nominal money balances are needed to pay for goods where the price
includes the tax τ ct .
In each period, the household consumes goods and leisure, and can accumulate bonds, cash, or
deposits in the PA. So, the per period budget constraint is
Ptct (1 + τ
c
t ) + Pt (1− j∗t ) f
(
1 + τft
)
+Mt+1 +Dt+1 +B
H
t+1 =Ptht +Mt + (1 + it)
(
BHt +Dt
)
, t = 1, 2, ..
(4)
Note that (1− j∗t ) f
(
1 + τft
)
is the overall cost in consumption units of using a PA for varieties j ≥ j∗t .
Here, labor supply ht to the intermediate good sector is the time endowment minus leisure and the
time transactions cost i.e.
ht = 1− lt − st (5)
Also, here, Dt, BHt are holdings of deposits and bonds at time t. Finally, following Chari et al. (1996),
we assume that M0 = D0 = BH0 = 0; if these initial conditions do not hold, then the government’s
problem is trivial.17
16For example, using a sample of Dutch retailers, ten Raa and Shestalova (2004) estimate that the point at which households
switch from cash to electronic payment media is somewhere between 13 and 30 Euros. More recently Wang and Wolman (2016)
find similar switching thresholds for a large data-set for the US.
17As is well-known, if the initial stock M0 +D0 +BH0 of nominal assets is positive (negative), then welfare is maximized by
setting the initial price level to infinity (or sufficiently low). See Chari et al. (1996, p207).
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3.4 Government
The government chooses a sequences of expenditures, taxes, and nominal interest rates
{
gt, τ
c
t , τ
f
t , it
}∞
t=1
to maximize the utility of the representative household (1), subject to the government budget con-
straint and optimization decisions by households, firms, and banks. Implicit in the choice of the
nominal interest rate is a choice of ad valorem tax on real money balances. Moreover, to ensure that
the choice between cash and a PA is not trivial, we assume that cash has a real resource cost, as in
Correia and Teles (1996). If fiat money were free, the optimal tax on real money balances is zero, and
then the household would not use a PA.18 Specifically, we assume that there is a strictly positive per
unit resource cost of real money balances, γ > 0. As we show below, the price facing the household
for the use of real money balances is it (1 + τ ct ). The cost to the government of providing a unit of real
money balances is γ. So, the implicit ad valorem tax τmt on real money balances is defined by the
identity it (1 + τ ct ) = γ(1 + τmt ). So, effectively, the government sets a tax on real money balances as
follows:
τmt =
it (1 + τ
c
t )
γ
− 1 (6)
Note that because it is also a government policy instrument, τmt and τ ct are set separately.
Also note that given all the other tax instruments, a wage income tax is redundant for the govern-
ment. This is because as is well-known in public finance, a wage income tax is equivalent to uniform
consumption tax on all goods (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 2015, p309), and here, we effectively only have
one good, as all varieties are consumed in fixed proportions. Unlike many papers, which drop a con-
sumption tax to eliminate the redundancy (e.g. Atkeson et al. (1999)), we retain the consumption tax
because we want to be able to compare the consumption tax to the tax on fees.
As is standard in the literature, we solve the government’s tax design problem using the primal
approach, as described in more detail in Section 5 below. In this approach, we allow the government
to choose all the variables {lt, ct,mt, j∗t }∞t=1 to maximize household utility subject to aggregate re-
source implementation constraints; the latter ensures that government choices can be decentralized.
Once we have characterized the solution to this problem, we can “back out” the time path for the
government’s actual policy variables i.e. the taxes on fees and consumption, τft , τ ct and the nominal
interest rate it.
3.5 Discussion
Our model is closely related to Freeman and Kydland (2000), and also Henriksen and Kydland (2010)
and Lucas and Nicolini (2015), which build on the original Freeman-Kydland model. These models
are, however, somewhat more complex as they are designed to be calibrated to macroeconomic ag-
gregates. The model of Freeman and Kydland (2000) is used to explain certain correlations in the
data, such as the positive correlation of Ml and the deposit-to-currency ratio with real output.19 The
model of Henriksen and Kydland (2010) does analyze quantitatively the welfare cost of inflation and
18A formal proof of this point is as follows. Assume for convenience following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010), that s =
σ
(
c
m
)
c, and that there is a finite value of velocity v = c
m
, v¯ such that the household is satiated i.e. σ′ (v¯) = 0. Then, if real
balances are untaxed, from (11) below, the household will use real money balances up to the point where smt = 0 or mt = v¯ct,
which in turn implies from (A.6) below, that emt = 0 as long as j∗t = 1. But, if emt = γ = 0, then from (21) below, it is optimal
to have smt = 0, completing the argument.
19Lucas and Nicolini (2015) extends the model of Freeman and Kydland (2000) to allow for different types of payment
accounts, and uses it to analyze regulatory changes in the US.
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compares it to the welfare cost of a labor tax, and so it is closer in spirit to what we do here, but it
does not analyze the optimal tax problem analytically.
In more detail, start from the model of Henriksen and Kydland (2010). Then, if we drop capital
as a factor of production, introduce government bonds as a store of value, and set the reserve ratio
for the banking system equal to zero, we arrive at a model that is very close to the one of this paper.
We think that these simplifications are appropriate because our objective is to characterize optimal
taxes, not explain macroeconomic aggregates.
However, a major difference is that we model transactions costs somewhat differently. In Henrik-
sen and Kydland (2010), the transactions cost s is interpreted as the number of trips the household
makes to the asset market, or a savings account. On each trip, the household can sell capital and
thus replenish its stocks of both fiat money and deposits. This seems to us a somewhat old-fashioned
way of thinking about time transactions costs. As already mentioned, a key feature of electronic
banking is that the time cost of moving money from (say) a savings account to the PA is very low and
we in fact set that cost to zero. Rather, s in our model is the cost of obtaining and managing cash e.g.
trips to ATMs, guarding against theft, etc.
Finally, if we assume that only fiat money can be used for purchases, i.e. if we impose j∗ ≡ 1,
our model reduces to the model of Correia and Teles (1996) or Teles (2003). So, our results can be
interpreted as generalizations of theirs. Note that in order to nest the Correia-Teles model as a
special case, we assume away any resource costs of making cash withdrawals (as opposed to card
payments), so that the only cost to the household of maintaining a real cash balance m is s. We make
this assumption both to keep the analysis manageable, and so so that we can link our results to the
existing literature on the optimal inflation tax.
4 Household Behavior
In this section, we characterize household behavior, given a fixed sequence of taxes and government
expenditures. We can write (4) in real terms as
ct (1 + τ
c
t ) + (1− j∗t )f
(
1 + τft
)
+ (1 + pit+1)
(
1 + τ ct+1
)
mt+1 + (1 + pit+1)
(
dt+1 + b
H
t+1
)
= (7)
ht +mt (1 + τ
c
t ) + (1 + it)
(
dt + b
H
t
)
, t = 1, 2, ..
where pit+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
− 1 is the rate of inflation, and τ ct is a consumption tax. Substituting out dt+ bHt in
(7), and using (5), we obtain the present-value budget constraint:
∞∑
t=0
χt
(
ct (1 + τ
c
t ) + (1− j∗t ) f
(
1 + τft
)
+ it (1 + τ
c
t )mt
)
=
∞∑
t=0
χt
(
1− lt − s
(
(j∗t )
2
ct,mt
))
(8)
where χt =
t∏
j=1
1
Rt
, and Rt = 1+it1+pit . We can make two remarks at this point,. First, as deposits
are perfect substitutes for bonds, the choice of dt by the household is indeterminate. Second, as is
standard, the opportunity cost of holding real money balances is the nominal interest forgone i.e.
it; the complication here is that the opportunity cost is also scaled by 1 + τ ct because one unit of
consumption costs 1 + τ ct from (7).
The household then maximizes (1) subject to (8). To write the first-order conditions compactly,
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we will use the notation uct for the derivative of u(ct, lt) with respect to ct, with second and cross-
derivatives being denoted ucct, uclt and so on.20 Using this notation, we can write the first-order
conditions for choice of ct, lt,mt, j∗t respectively as:
βtuct = λχt
(
1 + τ ct + (j
∗
t )
2
sxt
)
(9)
βtult = λχt (10)
it (1 + τ
c
t ) = −smt (11)
f
(
1 + τft
)
= sxt2ctj
∗
t (12)
where λ is the multiplier on (8) and where it is understood that sxt is the derivative with respect
to xt = (j∗t )
2
ct from (3). Note from (11), the household uses real money balances up to the point
where the cost, it (1 + τ ct ), is equal to the marginal reduction in transactions time, −smt. So, as Teles
(2003) observes, the true cost of money to the household is not it, but it (1 + τ ct ), reflecting the fact
that money is implicitly subject to the consumption tax, because of the need to use money to pay the
consumption tax. Similarly, (12) says that the household uses payment services up to the point where
the per transaction cost of doing so, f
(
1 + τft
)
, is equal to time transaction cost saving sxt2ctj∗t .
Finally, a note on the second-order conditions. Given strict quasi-concavity of the utility function
in ct, lt, and by inspection of (8), we just need s
(
(j∗)2 c,m
)
to be convex in c,m, and j∗. It is tedious
but straightforward to check that sufficient conditions for this are simply that s is convex in its
arguments x,m.21
5 The Tax Design Problem for the Government
As already remarked, we solve the government’s tax design problem using the primal approach. In
this approach, we allow the government to choose the quantity variables {lt, ct,mt, j∗t }∞t=1 to maximize
household utility (1) subject to the resource constraint and the implementation constraint, which
ensures that government choices can be decentralized. Once we have characterized the solution to
this problem, we can “back out” the time path for the government’s actual policy variables i.e. the
taxes on fees, real money balances, and consumption,
{
τft , τ
m
t , τ
c
t
}∞
t=1
.
The resource constraint simply says that the output of the intermediate good, 1 − lt − st, is no
smaller than the demand for that good. Following Correia and Teles (1996), we assume that in
each period, there is an exogenous level of public good provision gt. The intermediate good also
produces the final consumption good ct, and must also cover the real resource cost the banking
system,(1− j∗t ) f , and of real money balances, γmt. So, the resource constraint can be written as
ct + γmt + (1− j∗t ) f + gt ≤ 1− lt − st (13)
The implementation constraint is obtained by substituting the household first-order conditions
into the present value budget constraint. Substituting (9), (12) into (8), and rearranging, we get (see
20So, the “t” denotes the time at which the derivative is taken, not the derivative with respect to t, which of course is not
even defined, as time is discrete.
21This is satisfied in the Baumol-Tobin case, for example as sxx = 0, smm = αxm3 > 0, smx = − αm2 , which implies
sxxsmm ≤ (smx)2 .
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Appendix):
∞∑
t=0
βt (ctuct + ult (st − xtsxt −mtsmt + sxt2ctj∗t (1− j∗t ) + lt − 1)) = 0 (14)
This derivation shows that (14) is necessary for an allocation {ct, lt,mt, j∗t }∞t=0 to be decentralizable;
following standard arguments in the literature, it is also possible to prove that (14) is sufficient.
To interpret (14), we can rewrite the implementation constraint more compactly as
∞∑
t=0
βt (ctuct − ult (et − lt)) = 0 (15)
where
et = xtsxt +mtsmt − st − sxt2ctj∗t (1− j∗t ) + 1 (16)
Now, the key observation is that (15) is the implementation constraint of a standard dynamic tax
problem where et is an endowment of time in period t. So, we will refer to et as the virtual time
endowment, and note that it is generally affected by choices of ct,mt, j∗t . Note also that mt, j∗t only
enter the tax design problem via et and the resource constraint. We assume from now on that s is
homogeneous of degree k in x,m, and so by Euler’s theorem, we can write22
et = (k − 1) st − sxt2ctj∗t (1− j∗t ) + 1 (17)
As is standard in the primal approach to tax design, we can incorporate the implementability
constraint (15) into the government’s maximand by writing an effective objective for the government
of
Wt (ct, lt, et) = u (ct, lt) + µ (uctct − ult (et − lt)) (18)
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier on (15).
So, to summarize, the tax design problem for the government is the choice of {ct, lt,mt, j∗t }∞t=0
to maximize
∑∞
t=0 β
tWt subject to (13), the usual non-negativity constraints on {ct, lt,mt, st} , and
also that j∗t ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that the non-negativity constraints are non-binding, but we will be
interested also in the case where j∗t = 1 i.e. where only cash is used, as this relates to the existing
literature.
6 Results
6.1 First-Order Conditions for the Government’s Problem
First, we write down the first-order conditions for the government’s tax design problem. Assuming
0 < j∗t < 1 at the optimum, the first-order conditions are the following:
22Specifically, xtsxt +mtsmt = kst.
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Wct − ξt
(
1 + (j∗t )
2
sxt
)
= 0 (19)
Wlt − ξt = 0 (20)
−µultemt − ξt (smt + γ) = 0 (21)
−µultejt + ξt (f − sxt2ctj∗t ) = 0 (22)
where βtξt is the Lagrange multiplier on the period t resource constraint.23 Here, ejt denotes the
derivative of et with respect to j∗t , and emt denotes the derivative of et with respect to mt. In what
follows, we will assume that the multiplier on the implementability constraint is strictly positive i.e.
µ > 0. To see the economic meaning of this, note first that
Wlt = ult + µ (ucltc− ullt(et − lt) + ult) (23)
Note that in calculating (23), we use the fact that et is independent of lt. Then, combining (20) and
(23), we get, after some manipulation:
µ =
ξt − ult
ult
1
1 +Hlt
, Hlt =
ucltct − ullt (et − lt)
ult
(24)
Here, ξt−ultξt is the value of one unit of labor to the government, relative to its value to the household,
and thus measures the social gain from additional taxation at the margin. We will assume that this
is positive; if it is negative or zero, there is no need for distortionary taxation. Also, as uclt ≥ 0 is
assumed, 1+Hlt ≥ 0 as long as et ≥ lt. But from (17), et ≥ lt as long as s is not “too large”. Given that
estimated transactions costs in practice are a very small share of total available time (see Section 7
below), this seems a reasonable assumption to make.
6.2 Optimal Payment Service Taxes
The first-order conditions for the government’s tax design problem can be combined with the house-
hold’s first-order conditions to “back out” intuitive formulae for the optimal taxes. This Proposition
is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. If 0 < j∗t < 1 at the optimum, then the optimal payment service taxes are
τft
1 + τft
= Z
(
1− k + 1− 2j
∗
t
j∗t
+ 2εxt
1− j∗t
j∗t
)
, εxt =
sxxtxt
sxt
≥ 0 (25)
τmt
1 + τmt
= Z
(
1− k + 2εmt 1− j
∗
t
j∗t
)
εmt =
sxmtxt
smt
> 0 (26)
where Z = µultξt > 0.
So, we see that both taxes take a similar form; there is a term in 1 − k, where k is the returns
to scale in the transactions cost function, and then a term in the elasticity of the marginal time
23This specification of the Lagrange multiplier just ensures that ξt is time-invariant in the steady state and is thus just
made to simplify the presentation.
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transactions cost of additional cash purchases with respect to x, εxt (for fees), or with respect to m,
εmt (for cash). In particular, the taxes are both decreasing in k and increasing in the elasticities.
We can develop some intuition for this as follows. The general principle is that the household has
a virtual time endowment et, which is untaxable directly. But, it is taxable indirectly via choice of
payment services taxes. Thus, a tax will be positive if it indirectly reduces the virtual time endow-
ment via its impact on household choices of mt, j∗t . Thus, in general terms, the intuition is similar to
that of Corlett and Hague (1953), that taxes should be set to indirectly tax untaxable leisure. How-
ever, the specific mechanisms are quite different; in Corlett and Hague, the key variable is the degree
of complementarity in preferences between leisure and the taxed goods. Here, it is the properties of
the transactions technology that are key.
Specifically, consider first an increase in τmt . This will decrease the use of cash balances m by
the household. In turn, by inspection of (17), this decrease in m has two effects on et. First, as s is
decreasing in m, an increase τmt decreases the virtual labor endowment if k < 1. In this case, the
tax will be positive. This explains the term in 1 − k in (26). A second effect is that as sxm < 0, the
decrease in m increases sx and thus reduces et. This explains the second positive term in εmt in (26).
Next, consider an increase in τft . This will decrease the use of the PA by the households i.e.
increase j∗, which raises x. In turn, by inspection of (17), this increase in x has three effects on et.
First, as s is increasing in x, an increase τft decreases the virtual labor endowment if k < 1. In this
case, the tax will be positive. This explains the term in 1−k in (25). A second effect is that as sxx > 0,
the increase in x increases sx and thus reduces et. This explains the positive term in εxt in (25).
A final effect is that an increase in j∗has an ambiguous effect on j∗t (1− j∗t ), and thus et, in (17); it
increases (decreases) it if j∗t < 0.5 (j∗t > 0.5). This explains the middle term in (25).
What can we say about the signs and relative sizes of the taxes? Note first from (26) that as long
as k ≤ 1, τmt > 0 i.e. the inflation tax is positive. But, we cannot be sure that the tax on fees will
be positive, due to the second term 1−2j
∗
t
j∗t
which can be negative, and indeed, we will shortly see that
this is a possibility.
To get further results on the relative size of the payment taxes, we assume the special case where
s = αx
k+1
m . If k = 0, this is Baumol specification of s. If k = 1, it is a special case of Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2010)’s specification σ
(
x
m
)
x. With this specification of s, it is easily calculated that
εxt = k, εmt = k + 1 and as a consequence, we can show:
Proposition 2. If 0 < j∗t < 1 at the optimum, and s = αx
k+1
m , then τ
f
t < τ
m
t i.e. fees should be taxed
at a lower rate than cash. Also, τft > 0 iff j∗t < 1+2k1+3k , and τ
m
t > 0 iff j∗t < 2+2k1+3k .
So, we see that in this special case, both taxes are positive if the fraction of goods purchased with
cash, j∗t , is small relative to k. For particular values of k, we can say more. In the Baumol-Tobin case,
where k = 0, we see immediately that we always have τmt , τ
f
t > 0, irrespective of j∗t . If k = 1, then
the condition for τmt > 0 always holds, and τ
f
t > 0 if and only if j∗t < 34 , but if j
∗
t >
3
4 , fees should be
subsidized. The conditions for non-negative taxes of course follow fairly directly from (25), (26) as k
appears negatively in both (25), (26), and j∗t appears positively in (26) and also in (25) if j∗t < 0.5.
We conclude by linking our results to two important existing literatures on optimal tax. The first
is the classic Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) result on production efficiency. To proceed, note that in
our model, there is a special kind of household production technology, where aggregate consumption
c is “produced” from purchases of individual varieties c(i) plus a time input s, real money balances
m, and fees f (1− j∗). So, following the literature on household production, it is of interest to know
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when there is production efficiency for the household in the Diamond-Mirrlees sense, i.e. when inputs
to aggregate consumption are untaxed. As the time input s is untaxable by definition, production
efficiency requires that the taxes on money and fees will be zero. But, from Proposition 2, we see that
as long as k ≤ 1, τmt > 0 i.e. the inflation tax is positive. So, we can state:
Proposition 3. If 0 < j∗t < 1 at the optimum, then there is never production efficiency for the house-
hold i.e. the use of cash and PAs is always distorted by the tax system if k ≤ 1.
We can make two observations at this point. First, the Diamond-Mirrlees result says that a
sufficient condition for production efficiency is constant returns to scale in production. Here, the
analogous assumption, i.e. constant returns in s(x,m) i.e. k = 1 is not sufficient. For example, from
(26), if k = 1, τmt = 0 additionally requires sxmt = 0, and the latter does not hold for any of the
specifications of the transactions cost function s considered in the literature. So, in this setting, the
Diamond-Mirrlees result does not carry over in a simple way to household production.
Second, Proposition 3 is related to the literature on household production, which finds that the
optimal tax structure should generally distort the use of inputs in household production, as we do. For
example, Sandmo (1990) shows that in a simple model where the final consumption can be produced
from household time and a produced input, the household input should generally be taxed. The paper
by Kleven et al. (2000), which extends Sandmo’s analysis, finds similar results.
The second literature that we wish to link to is the existing literature on the optimal inflation tax.
In that literature, cash is the only medium of exchange, so we assume that at the optimum, j∗t = 1.
This might be because the cost of money γ is very low. In this case, from (26), we see
τmt
1 + τmt
= Z (1− k) (27)
In such a case, the tax on real money balances is entirely determined by the returns in the time
transaction demand function s. This is exactly the result in Correia and Teles (1996) and Teles (2003).
As Teles (2003) remarks, "if the transactions technology is constant returns to scale, so that k = 1,
the modified Friedman rule is optimal. If k > 1, money should be subsidized, and if k < 1, money
should be taxed." So, we see that our results nest Correia and Teles (1996) as a special case. Also,
comparing Proposition 2 to their result, we see that when the household has a choice of transactions
technologies, compared to the Corriea-Teles formula, real money balances will be taxed more heavily.
This is because increasing money balances have an additional positive effect on the virtual time
endowment et via sx when j∗t < 1. In other words, their simple characterization of τmt in (27) is not
robust to alternative forms of payment.
6.3 The Consumption Tax
We now turn to the optimal tax on consumption. We have the following characterization of the
optimal consumption tax in ad valorem form, as a fraction of the total price of consumption, inclusive
of both tax and time transactions costs:
Proposition 4. The optimal consumption tax as a fraction of the tax-inclusive price of consumption
is
τ ct
1 + τ ct + (j
∗
t )
2
sxt
=
ξt − ult
ξt
(Hlt −Hct)
1 +Hlt
(28)
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where Hct = 1uct (ucctct − uclt (et − lt)− ultect) and Hlt is defined in (24).
This is proved in the Appendix. This formula is in fact very close to the formula for the optimal
consumption tax in the usual static case without a transactions technology, when the primal approach
is used (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 2015). The term of the left-hand side of the formula is the consumption
tax expressed as a fraction of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.
This can be seen by dividing equation (9) by (10), giving the marginal rate of substitution equal to 1+
τ ct +(j
∗
t )
2
sxt. This differs from the standard formula due to the inclusion of the term (j∗t )
2
sxt, which is
the additional time transactions cost associated with an additional unit of consumption. On the right-
hand side, as already remarked, ξt−ultξt is the value of one unit of labor to the government, relative
to its value to the household, and thus measures the social gain from additional taxation at the
margin. Second, by inspection, −Hct measures the degree of complementarity between consumption
and leisure; the higher this is, other things equal, the higher the total effective tax on consumption,
a well-known result. Note that if there are no transactions costs, i.e. et ≡ 1, then Hct reduces to
the standard formula found in the primal approach to the static tax design problem (Atkinson and
Stiglitz, 2015)24.
One might ask why in our dynamic setting, the consumption tax formula is qualitatively identical
to the static case. The reason is the following. In our dynamic model, the government controls the
marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption by the choice of the nominal
return on the savings instrument i.e. bonds, of it. This leaves the consumption tax as the instrument
to control the marginal rate of substitution within the period between consumption and leisure, as in
the static case. As a result, the formula for the optimal consumption tax in (28) is virtually identical
to the static case (conditional on the complications due to costly transactions, captured by the term
(j∗t )
2
sxt).
Finally, we can compare τ ct to the tax on fees. Using (24) to substitute out for µ, in (A.8), we get:
τft
1 + τft
=
ξt − ult
ξt
1
1 +Hlt
(
1− k + 1− 2j
∗
t
j∗t
+ 2εxt
1− j∗t
j∗t
)
(29)
So, comparing (28) and (29), we see that there is no obvious link between τ ct , τ
f
t ; the ratio of
the two depends on k and εxt, as well as Hlt − Hct. To investigate further, we turn to numerical
simulations.
7 A Calibrated Model
To showcase the main theoretical results, we use a calibrated version of the model to numerically
solve for the optimal value of the three endogenously determined taxes, τft , τ ct , τmt . The aim is to pro-
vide a sense of the relative sizes of taxes, and how results would vary with key exogenous parameters
such as the returns to scale in the time transactions cost function, k, and the cost of using the PA, f.
These parameters are particularly important for the following reasons. First, we already know that
24One might also ask how our result relates to the well-known Ramsey tax rules in static optimal tax theory. The connection
is as follows. First, in the special case where u is quasi-linear, i.e. u(c, l) = u(c) + l, Hlt = 0 and Hct = 1uct (ucctct − ect). If
we assume furthermore that there are no transactions costs, et = 1 and so ect = 0. Then, −Hct = −ucctctuct is just one over the
elasticity of demand for the consumption good, so (28) reduces just to the classic Ramsey inverse elasticity rule.
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Table 1: Parameter values
Parameter Description Values Source
θ Elasticity of utility w.r.t. consumption 1.0 Hall (1988); Gruber (2013) and others
η Elasticity of utility w.r.t. leisure 2.0 Mankiw et al. (1985)
A Leisure parameter 1.2 calibrated
g Government expenditure 0.11 calibrated
α Transaction cost parameter 0.018 calibrated
f Bank fee 0.01-0.02 Philippon (2015) and Bazot (2014)
γ Resource cost of fiat money 0.02 calibrated
k Degree of homogeneity of s 0-1
k plays an important role in determining the optimal inflation tax. Furthermore, analytically, we
have shown that when k is small (at zero or close to it), τf should be positive. Second, empirically,
technological innovation is driving f lower over time, and we would like to know how this could affect
payment service taxes.
In this illustration, we assume that the exogenous expenditure requirement gt is constant over
time at g, in which case the economy converges immediately to a steady state. We use a standard
iso-elastic functional form for utility in (1) of the form:
u (c, l) =
1
1− θ
(
c1−θ − 1)+ A
1− η
(
l1−η − 1) (30)
In addition, we also assume the same functional form for s as in Proposition 2 i.e.
s (x,m) = α
xk+1
m
(31)
Here, k measures returns to scale, as above. Special cases include k = 0, which is the Baumol-Tobin
case, and k = 1,which is the specification of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010).
Using (30), (31), all the equilibrium conditions of the model, plus the first-order conditions to the
government’s optimal tax problem, can be written in a simplified form at the steady state. The details
are given in the Online Supplementary Appendix. In particular, the equilibrium conditions can be
written as a number of simultaneous equations in unknowns
(
c, l,m, j∗, λ, τ c, τm, τf , Z
)
as described
in the Online Supplementary Appendix. As defined in Proposition 1, Z = µulξ is the value of one
unit of labor to the government, relative to its value to the household, and thus the social gain from
additional taxation at the margin.
Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameters. First, θ, η are the utility function parameters, and
have the interpretation of the inverses of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of consumption
and leisure, respectively. There are a very large range of estimates of θ, ranging from an early
empirical study, Hall (1988), which concludes that it is not likely to be larger than 10, to more recent
studies which give values of θ of around 1 (Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio, 2003; Gruber, 2013).
Given this range, we take a central value of 1. Early empirical studies find η to be greater than 1
(Mankiw et al., 1985), while more recent studies (Smets and Wouters (2007, 2005)) find η to be near
2, and we therefore set η = 2.
Next, A, g are set to yield a plausible ratio of government expenditure to output of around 0.3.25
25Output is y = 1− l − s.
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Figure 1: Optimal tax rates as k increases
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Note: In the figure, f = 0.019 rather than our central value of f = 0.015.
Then, α is set to target a realistic value for s. Based on a recent study of transactions costs, (Chakra-
vorti and Mazzotta, 2013), we assume that the household spends about 10 hours a year managing
cash. This includes time spent visiting ATMs, etc. This gives a target value for s of 10 divided by
total number of hours in the year, i.e. 16x365=5840, which gives s = 0.17%. Next, our central value of
f is set at 0.015, based on Philippon (2015) and Bazot (2018), who calculate that the costs of financial
intermediation for the banking sector in the US and Europe are around 2.5 to 3 percent of assets
intermediated.26 Finally, γ is set to ensure that the share of transactions that are cash, measured
by j∗, is around 50 percent, a reasonable figure for the US and Europe.27 Finally, k, the degree of
homogeneity of s, is chosen to range between 0 and 1, which covers all the usual specifications in the
literature.
Before we turn to numerical simulations of the optimal taxes, we perform a simple comparative
statics exercise to understand how key endogenous variables (j∗,m, c, l) respond the changes in ex-
ogenous taxes (τf , τm), varying τ c residually to satisfy the government budget constraint. The details
are reported in the Online Appendix Section C. They show that as expected, (j∗,m) rise as PAs are
more heavily taxed, and fall as cash in more heavily taxed. Other variables are not not very sensitive
to the payment service taxes.
Now we turn to our main results. Figures 1 and 2 show how the optimal taxes τ c, τm, τf change
as the key parameters k, f change. Note that τ c, τm, τf are all of the same order of magnitude, and
the implied interest rate i, from the relationship (6), takes a sensible rate of values between 1 and 3
percent (not reported here).
26The precise calculation is as follows. The real value of consumption purchased using PAs is c
(
1− (j∗)2
)
, and the real
value of resources used in payments is f (1− j∗) . So, in the model, the cost of bank payment services as a share of consumption
is f(1−j
∗)
c(1−(j∗)2) =
f
c(1+j∗) . From Schmiedel et al. (2012), and the discussion in the introduction, we estimate this to be to be
about 3%. So, we set f
c(1+j∗) = 0.03. In our model, which calibrated to a consumption to GDP ratio of 0.7, c = 0.25 on average,
and also also j∗ is calibrated to 0.5. Substituting these elements into the last equation gives a value of f = 0.011. This turns
out to give rise to computational problems, and so we choose a slightly higher central value of f = 0.015.
27Matheny et al. (2016, p3) reports that “In 2015, cash remained the most frequently used retail payment instrument, used
in nearly one-third (32 percent) of all transactions, including bill payments”. Esselink and Hernández (2017) and Bagnall
et al. (2016) report an even higher ratio of cash usage.
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Figure 2: Optimal tax rates as f increases
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Note: In the figure, k = 1.
In Figure 1, k varies between 0 and 1, while f is fixed. This figure shows that first, both τm, τf
decrease markedly as the returns to scale in transactions costs increase, though τm remains positive
at k = 1. Also, we see that τm is consistently bigger than τm , consistent with Proposition 1. We
also see that for k above 0.5 or so, τf becomes a subsidy, a possibility that was shown theoretically
in the previous section. We also see that real money balances should be taxed, τm > 0, even when
k = 1. This is consistent with our theoretical finding in the previous section that the Correia-Teles
result is not robust to alternative forms of payment. Finally, we see that both taxes are never zero at
once, meaning that the use of cash and PAs is always distorted by the tax system, consistently with
Proposition 3.
In Figure 2, f varies between 0.01 and 0.02. This figure shows that both τm, τf decrease markedly
as the fee to scale in transactions costs increase, though τm remains positive at k = 1. This figure is
again consistent with our theoretical results. For example, we see that τm is consistently bigger than
τm , consistent with Proposition 1. We also see that for f above 0.015 or so, τf becomes a subsidy,
a possibility that was shown theoretically in the previous Section. One intuition for why τf can be
negative can be gleaned from (A.3). As f rises, j∗t increases i.e. cash is used more, and this tends to
make the effect of j∗t on the virtual leisure endowment, ejt positive. So, in order to indirectly tax this
virtual leisure endowment, j∗t should be reduced, which can be achieved by subsidizing PAs.
8 Conclusions
This paper has considered the optimal taxation of payment services, when realistically, the household
can use either cash and or a bank account with services, such as debit cards, for the purchase of
different varieties of goods. The setting is an extension of Correia and Teles (1996), to allow for the
use of bank accounts as a form of payment, as in Freeman and Kydland (2000). Our first contribution
is to develop simple formulae for the optimal ad valorem taxes on both real money balances and
payment fees. For common specifications of the time transaction cost function, we can show that
the tax on real money balances is always greater than the tax on fees, and also, while the former is
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always positive, the tax on fees may be negative.
Numerical results, using a calibrated version of the model, yielded additional insights. We found
that both the inflation tax and the tax on fees decrease markedly as the returns to scale in transac-
tions costs increase from zero to one. The results show also that both the inflation tax and the tax on
fees increase as the bank fee decreases; this is interesting as the move away from cash is ultimately
driven by technological innovation that reduces fees. Moreover, when the fee is large, the fee tax can
be negative, i.e. bank fees should be subsidized. We also find that the tax on bank fees, can be greater
or less than the rate of consumption tax, although both taxes are of the same order of magnitude. So,
our results show fairly robustly that this part of banking sector activity should probably not be left
untaxed.
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A Appendix.
Construction of the Implementation Constraint. From (9)-(12) we have ,
χt =
βtult
λ
χtit (1 + τ
c
t ) =
βtult
λ
(−smt)
χt (1 + τ
c
t ) =
βtuct
λ
− χt (j∗t )2 sxt =
βtuct
λ
− β
tult
λ
(j∗t )
2
sxt
χtf
(
1 + τft
)
(1− j∗t ) =
βtult
λ
sxt2ctj
∗
t (1− j∗t )
So, substituting these expressions in (8), we get:
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ct
(
uct − ult (j∗t )2 sxt
)
− ultsmtmt + ultsxt2ctj∗t (1− j∗t )
)
=
∞∑
t=0
βtult (1− lt − st) (A.1)
Rearranging (A.1) gives (14) as required. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Combining first-order conditions (11), (21) with 6, and (12) with (22), we
get general formulae for the optimal taxes:
τmt =
µultemt
γξt
, τft = −
µultejt
fξt
(A.2)
Next, using using (A.2) and (17), we can compute et = (k − 1) st − sxt2ctj∗t (1− j∗t )
ejt = (1− k) sxtctj∗t − 2sxxtct² (j∗t )2 (1− j∗t )− sxtct (1− 2j∗t )
to compute ejt, we see that
τft = −2
µult
fξt
(
(1− k) sxtctj∗t + 2sxxtct2 (j∗t )2 (1− j∗t ) + sxtct (1− 2j∗t )
)
(A.3)
Then, using the household optimization condition (12) to substitute out for f , we get
τft
1 + τft
=
µult
ξtsxtctj∗t
(
(1− k) sxtctj∗t + 2sxxtct² (j∗t )2 (1− j∗t ) + sxtct (1− 2j∗t )
)
(A.4)
Finally, simplifying the right-hand side of (A.4), and using xt = (j∗t )ct, we get
τft
1 + τft
= Z
(
1− k + 1− 2j
∗
t
j∗t
+ 2εxt
1− j∗t
j∗t
)
, εxt =
sxxtxt
sxt
> 0 (A.5)
where Z = µultξt .
For the optimal inflation tax, the argument is similar. First, using (A.2) and (17), to compute emt,
we get:
τmt =
Z
γ
((k − 1) smt − sxmt2ctj∗t (1− j∗t )) (A.6)
Next, using the household optimization condition (11) and the definition of the inflation tax (6), we
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get a formula for γ:
γ = − smt
1 + τmt
(A.7)
Then combining (A.6) and (A.7) gives
τmt
1 + τmt
= Z
(
1− k + 2εmt 1− j
∗
t
j∗t
)
εmt =
sxmtxt
smt
> 0
as required. 
Proof of Proposition 2. If s = αx
k+1
m , then it is easily checked that εxt = k, εmt = k + 1, so (25) (26)
become
τft
1 + τft
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(
1− k + 1− 2j
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, (A.8)
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)
(A.9)
Assume to the contrary that τft ≥ τmt . Then from (A.8), (A.9), as Z > 0, we see that
1− 2j∗t
j∗t
+ 2k
1− j∗t
j∗t
≥ 2(k + 1)1− j
∗
t
j∗t
which rearranges to 1−2j
∗
t
1−j∗t ≥ 2, which is impossible. To complete the proof, we note that the term
in brackets in (A.8) is positive if j∗t < 2k1+3k , and the term in brackets in (A.9) is positive if j
∗
t <
1+2k
1+3k .

Proof of Proposition 4. (i) From (19)-(22), we have:
Wct
Wlt
=
uct
ult
1 + µ (1 +Hct)
1 + µ (1 +Hlt)
= 1 + (j∗t )
2
sxt (A.10)
where Hlt, Hct are defined in the paper above. And, from (9),(10):
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= 1 + τ ct + (j
∗
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2
sxt (A.11)
Combining (A.10), (A.11), we get(
1 + τ ct + (j
∗
t )
2
sxt
)
(1 + µ (1 +Hct)) =
(
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2
sxt
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Rearranging (A.12), we get:
τ ct (1 + µ (1 +Hct)) = µ (Hlt −Hct)
(
1 + (j∗t )
2
sxt
)
(A.13)
Adding τ ct µ (Hlt −Hct) to both sides, and and rearranging, we get
τ ct
1 + (j∗t )
2
sxt + τ ct
=
µ (Hlt −Hct)
1 + µ (1 +Hlt)
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Using (A.13), and (24) and rearranging, we get
τ ct
1 + (j∗t )
2
sxt + τ ct
=
(
ξt − ult
ξt
)
(Hlt −Hct)
1 +Hlt
(A.14)
as required. 
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A Equations of the Calibrated Model
In the steady state, the resource constraint is
c+ γm+ (1− j∗) f + g = 1− l − s (A.15)
From (8), in the steady state, the per period household real budget constraint is
c (1 + τ c) + i (1 + τ c)m+ (1− j∗) (1 + τf) f(1− l − s) = 1− l − s
Using (6), γ (1 + τm) = i (1 + τ c), this can be rewritten
c (1 + τ c) + γ (1 + τm)m+ (1− j∗) (1 + τf)f = 1− l − s (A.16)
The household optimization conditions are
c−θ = λ
1 + τ c + (k + 1)α
(
c (j∗)2
)k
m
(j∗)2
 (A.17)
Al−η = λ (A.18)
γ (1 + τm) = α
(
c (j∗)2
)k+1
m2
(A.19)
f
(
1 + τf
)
= (k + 1)α
(
c (j∗)2
)k
m
2cj∗ (A.20)
The optimal tax conditions are
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where Z =
(
ξ−ult
ξ
)
1
1+Hl
will be treated as an endogenous variable. Note that this formula for Z is
obtained by combining the expression in Proposition 1 with (24).
We also have 4 auxiliary variables. The transaction technology is
s = α
(
c (j∗)2
)k+1
m
(A.24)
where k is the returns to scale.
The endowment of leisure, e is given by
e = (k − 1) s− 2 (k + 1)α (c(j
∗)2)
k
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∗ (1− j∗) + 1
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and therefore
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∗
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)
s+ 1 (A.25)
Moreover, from (24) and (28) in the paper, Hl, Hc are:
Hl =
1
Al−η
Aηl−(η+1) (e− l) = 1
l
η (e− l) (A.26)
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1
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(A.27)
So, we have a system of 9 equations (A.15) to (A.23) in 9 unknowns (Z, c, l,m, j∗, λ, τ c, τm, τf ), plus
4 auxiliary equations (A.24) to (A.27) defining s, e,Hl, Hc.
This system of equations is simulated in GAMS, using the CONOPT solver which was shown to
be a robust solver for highly nonlinear problems.3
3General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) is a high-level modeling system for mathematical programming and opti-
mization. The GAMS code can be provided by the authors upon request.
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B Sensitivity Analysis to Changes in Taxes
The simulations reported in Section 7 solves the optimal taxes endogenously: (i) the tax on real
money balances τm, (ii) the bank fee tax τf , and (iii) tax on goods τc. Next, to provide additional
information on how the model behaves, we solve the model using exogenous taxes. This essentially
means that equations (A.21) to (A.23), and (A.25) to (A.27), are removed. We fix either τf or τm, vary
the other, and calculate τc residually so that the government budget constraint is satisfied.
Figures 3 to 5 hold τm = 20%, and increases τf from -40% to 60%. In Figure 3, the endogenous tax
on goods, τc, varies slightly, though it is not very sensitive. Figure 4 shows a slight rise in the share
of consumption of output c/y, and slight fall in leisure l. Finally, Figure 5 shows that as tax on bank
fees τf increases, the share of money usage m increases, and therefore, the cutoff between cash and
bank accounts j increases - as discussed in the paper.
Changes as τf increases:
Figure 3: τm (fixed) and τc
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Figure 4: c/y and l
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Figure 5: j and m
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Next, Figures 6 to 8 hold τf = 20%, and raise τm from -10% to 80%. Figure 6 reports only a slight
change in τc - a slight fall. Figure 4 shows that both the share of consumption from output, c/y, and
leisure, l, are both stable, though the share of consumption from output slightly rises, while leisure
slightly falls. Finally, Figure 8 shows that as tax on real money balances τm increases, the share of
money m falls, as well as j falls, as discussed in the paper.
Changes as τm increases:
Figure 6: τf (fixed) and τc
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Figure 7: c/y and l
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Figure 8: j and m
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